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Reflections on the Senate's Role in the

Judicial Impeachment Process and
Proposals for Change
By

MITCH McCoNNELL*

INTRODUCTION

Hear ye! Hear ye! Hear ye! All persons are commanded to

keep silent, on .pam of imprisonment, while the House of
Representatives is exhibiting to the Senate of the United States
articles of impeachment against Harry E. Claiborne, U.S. dis-

trictjudge for the district of Nevada.1

With this tradition-bound invocation from the Sergeant at
Arms, the Umted States Senate began consideration of the impeachment of Judge Harry E. Claiborne-the first judicial impeachment in fifty years, and one of only eleven since the
establishment of the federal judiciary Four months after presentation of the impeachment articles, 2 and after a dramatic
appearance by Judge Claiborne at the eleventh hour, the Senate
voted overwhelmingly to convict Harry Claiborne of three out

* United States Senator. B.A., University of Louisville, 1964; J.D., University of
Kentucky, 1967. The author would like to extend his appreciation to Steven J. Law,
Legislative Assistant for Judiciary Committee matters, and to E. Neil Trautwein, Legislative Assistant for Education and Health matters, for their valuable assistance in
preparing this Article.
'132 CONG. Rac. S10,535 (daily ed. Aug. 6, 1986).
2 H.R. Res. 461, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986) (impeachment of Harry E. Claiborne,
Judge of the United States District Court for the District of Nevada).
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of the four articles of impeachment and to stnp him of his title
3
and office.
To lay the foundation for this rare and complex proceeding,
a special Senate Committee was appointed. This Committee, on
which the author served, labored intensely for more than two
months, amassing the necessary evidence and testimony as well
as processing the numerous motions made by Judge Claiborne
regarding the scope of the impeachment trial and the constitutionality of the entire proceeding.
Not surprisingly, many believed that the impeachment of
Judge Claiborne would never be undertaken by the Senate because of the tremendous burden imposed under the century-old
procedure for judicial impeachments. Judge Claiborne had been
convicted of tax fraud and had served ihree months of his twoyear sentence before the Senate even began consideration of the
matter Nevertheless, Claiborne had contested his conviction,
4
claiming to be the hapless victim of a "government vendetta."
He also refused to resign his office and continued to collect his
$78,700 yearly salary and pension benefits while in prison.
Finally, the House Judiciary Committee, under the chairmanship of Representative Peter Rodino, was goaded5 into draft6
ing four articles of impeachment against the convicted Judge.
After one hour of debate on the House floor, during which no
member spoke in Claiborne's defense, the House unanimously
7
approved the articles and sent them to the Senate.
This Article is divided into two parts. Part One discusses in
detail the Senate's role in impeaching Judge Claiborne, with

I Two-thirds of the Senators duly elected to serve and present are required to
convict for high cnmes and misdemeanors in any judicial impeachment proceeding. The
Senate found Claiborne guilty under Article I by 87-10 (Roll Call No. 335), guilty under
Article II by 90-7 (Roll Call No. 336), not guilty under Article III by 46-17 (Roll Call
No. 337), and guilty under Article IV by 89-8 (Roll Call No. 338), 99th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1986).
4 Cohodas, Impeachment Recommended for Imprisoned Federal Judge, CONG.
Q., June 28, 1986, at 1510.
The press and public became inflamed with statements such as those by Rep.
Henry J. Hyde, who repeatedly remarked that "[e]very day that Judge Claiborne
continues to collect his salary is an insult to every law-abiding citizen in this country."
N.Y. Times, Oct. 8, 1986, at A14.
6 Id.
7

132 CONG. REc. S10,535 (daily ed. Aug. 6, 1986).
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particular attention to the aspects of the proceeding that imposed
onerous burdens on the members' time and resources. With the
reader's indulgence, the author intends to draw extensively from
his own experiences and perceptions as a key participant in this
proceeding.
Part Two analyzes several recent and proposed changes in
the impeachment process, some of which were prompted by the
Senate's often frustrating and time-consuming experience with
the Claiborne matter. This analysis considers these changes in
the context of the recent impeachment proceedings as well as
the underlying governmental values that the impeachment process is intended to protect.
I.

THE CLAIBORNE IMPEACHMENT: SOME PERSONAL
REFLECTIONS

A.

The Controversy of the Special Senate Committee

Long before the articles of impeachment were exhibited to
the Senate, Judge Clalborne had shown every intention of
mounting a formidable, unrelenting procedural defense. Claiborne attacked the propriety of the investigation that resulted in
his original conviction and planned to call more than sixty
witnesses to testify, including then Chief Justice Warren Burger,
then F.B.I. Director William Webster, and former Attorney
General William French Smith.8
To complicate matters further, the managers of the impeachment, on behalf of the House of Representatives, filed a motion
seeking summary disposition of the impeachment on the basis
of the Third Article of impeachment. 9 This Article provided that
Congress could rely on Claiborne's earlier criminal conviction
as sufficient grounds for finding Claiborne guilty of "high cnmes
and msdemeanors"' 10 and move immediately to convict the Judge
and to strip him of office. Although such a motion, if granted,
would greatly expedite the impeachment, its reliance on a sepa-

Wash. Times, Sept. 15, 1986, at A4.
132 CONG. REc. S10,535 (daily ed. Aug. 6, 1986).
10U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
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rate judicial deterlmnation had never been tested before, and
the motion presented novel procedural and constitutional questions.
Therefore, the Senate created by resolution 1' a special Senate
Committee to "receive evidence and take testimony
[and]
exercise all powers and functions conferred upon the Senate and
the Presiding Officer of the Senate. -" 12 In order to conserve
the resources of the full Senate, which faced a clogged legislative
calendar near the end of the Ninety-Ninth Congress, this impeachment resolution gave the special committee broad powers
to prepare the impeachment record. 3
Although the committee expressly was constrained from rendering judgment on the articles of impeachment, its mandate to
prepare the case arguably gave the committee considerable latitude to decide it as well. 14 Ultimately, the committee was to
submit a final report to the Senate, which would be considered,
to all intents and purposes, subject to the right of the Senate
to determine competency, relevancy and matenality, as having
been received and taken before the Senate, but nothing herein
shall prevent the Senate from sending for any witness and
hearing his testimony in open Senate, or by order of the Senate
having the entire trial in open Senate."
The special committee innovation allowed the full Senate to
return to its legislative calendar, although it disrupted the legislative activities of the committee's twelve constituent members.
Further, it gave Claiborne a basis to challenge the constitutionality of the proceedings against him.16

" See S. Res. 479, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986) (amending the Rules of Procedure
and Practice in the Senate When Sitting on Impeachment Trials) [hereinafter Senate
Impeachment Rules].
12

Id.

13 Id.

This is implicit in the language of the Resolution and reflected in the motions
filed by Judge Claiborne urging the full Senate to convene as a court of impeachment
and not delegate its responsibility to a committee.
14

15

Id.

Claiborne argued that the Constitution requires the full Senate to decide whether
to impeach and that the committee process undermines the deliberative process involving
the entire body. See infra text accompanying notes 17-23.
16
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Claiborne promptly moved to have Senate Impeachment Rule
XI17

declared unconstitutional for delegating the Senate's im-

peachment powers to an ad hoc committee. He simultaneously
moved that the full Senate convene as a court of impeachment
to resolve his pretrial motions. He also insisted that the committee desist from receiving further evidence until his motions
had been ruled on. 18
Claiborne's collateral attack was short-lived, however. Senator Charles Mathias, Chairman of the Impeachment Committee, decided that his committee did not have the authority to
rule on any of the motions before it (including the House Managers' motion for summary disposition) 19 and20 referred all of
them to the full Senate for later consideration.
At the same time, Chairman Mathias flatly demed Claiborne's demand that the committee stop all further proceedings
until the full Senate convened to consider his motions. 21 Arguing
that the enabling resolution did not abrogate any of the Senate's
investigative and decision-making authority, the Chairman ruled
that the committee could proceed and that Claiborne could raise
his objections to the committee's existence and actions before
the full Senate when the Senate received the committee's final
report.22
Claiborne probably first moved against the special committee
for dilatory purposes. Had he been able to stall all further
proceedings until the full Senate convened in trial, Claiborne
might have been able to force the impeachment into the following year because of the Senate's already overflowing agenda.
After the dilatory strategy failed, Claiborne continued to
attack the constitutionality of the special committee. This attack
came in connection with his second main defensive position that

17Wash. Times, Sept. 15, 1986, at A4.
11See transcript of the Impeachment Committee's PretrialConference, Sept. 10,
1986 (meeting to hear and dispose of motions from counsel for Judge Claiborne, and
from the House Managers) [hereinafter PretrialConference].
19 Id.

20 See PretrialConference, supra note 18, and accompanying text.
21 See supra note 11 and accompanying text (Chairman Mathias exercised this
power as would a presiding judge, ruling on all motions put before the Committee).
2 Id.
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the Senate should consider evidence of improprieties in the original investigation that led to his earlier criminal conviction.2
B.

Defining the ProperScope of the Senate's Investigation

In terms of popular appeal, Judge Claiborne's most effective
line of defense was his assertion that the original investigation
that produced his criminal conviction was a "frame-up" in
which politically-motivated federal agents "burglarized" his
home, used perjured testimony, and "brainwashed" witnesses
for the prosecution. 24
Claiborne argued that these improprieties tainted the evidence from the earlier criminal proceeding and moved that the
Senate exclude "all of the evidence" from the impeachment
record.Y In addition, Clalborne sought to compel the appearances and testimony of sixty-six top-ranking government officials, either to prove the allegations of investigative impropriety
26
or to impose staggering delays in the proceeding.
Although Claiborne's self-portrait as a "stalked man" 27 generated a modicum of popular support, this line of defense proved
utterly futile in the Judge's efforts to exclude some evidence and
to compel other evidence. The special committee refused to call
most of the witnesses Claiborne requested and referred the exclusionary motion to the full Senate. 28
After the special committee subrmtted its final report to the
full Senate, Claiborne moved to reopen the impeachment trial
de novo and to compel testimony from a modified list of fiftyeight proposed witnesses. 29 On the second day of deliberation,
however, the Senate voted sixty-one to thirty-two to reject Claiborne's motion for a new, greatly expanded trial. 30

23 See infra notes 24-41 and accompanying text.

Wash. Post, Sept. 16, 1986, at A5; see also Wash. Post, Sept. 17, 1986, at AS.
21Wash. Post, Sept. 16, 1986, at A5.
SREPORT OF THE SENATE IMPEACHMENT TRIAL ComiTr-r

ON THE IMPEACHMENT

oF HARRY E. CLAiORNE, S.HRO. REP. No. 812, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 511 (1986).
27Wash. Post, Sept. 16, 1986, at A5.
" PretrialConference, supra note 18, and accompanying text.
9 132 CONG. REc., 99th Cong., 2d Sess. S15,557 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1986) (Roll
Call No. 334).
30 Wash. Post, Oct. 8, 1986, at A3.

1987-88]

SENATE'S ROLE IN IMPEACHMENT

In response, Claiborne tried to involve the judiciary in the
proceeding by filing an action in Umted States District Court
against the United States Senate. 31 His complaint asserted that,
because the special committee had refused unilaterally to gather
or to report evidence of investigative wrongdoing for the full
Senate, the special committee procedure effectively "deprived
[him] of the type of trial that every other impeached official has
'32
a full trial in front of the Senate."
had
Claiborne asked the court to find, as he had asserted previously 3 that the special committee procedure was unconstitutional. He further asked the court for an injunction to stay
further proceedings in the Senate, pending resolution of the
judicial action. 34 The court demed both requests, holding that
the committee's management of the impeachment trial, while
"unfortunate" and a "shortcut used for the first time," did not
unconstitutionally deprive Claiborne of his right to a trial before
35
the full Senate.
For the first time in the impeachment proceedings, the Senate
showed its frustration with Claiborne's dilatory tactics. The author of this Article and others protested the request for injunctive relief, citing the case Williams v Bush36 as authority that
"there has never been an instance in our history when the
Federal courts have presumed to tell a body of Congress, in the
-37
middle of its deliberations, how it should deliberate.
Further, in order to discourage Claiborne from appealing the
District Court ruling, the author urged Senate counsel in the
lawsuit to move for the imposition of sanctions under Rule 11
38
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

1,See

PretrialConference, supra note 18.
Wash. Post, Oct. 8, 1986, at A3.
11See PretrialConference, supra note 18.
34 Id.
31

35Id.

-1 Bush v. Orleans Pansh School Board and Williams v. State of Louisiana, 188
F Supp. 916 (E.D. La. 1960).
37 Id.
38 Rule I I requires that any motion filed by an attorney be:
to the best of [the attorney's] knowledge
warranted by existing law or
a good faith extension
and that it [not be] interposed for any improper
purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless
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There were two reasons why Judge Claiborne's collateral
attack on the earlier investigation did not succeed. First, the
court found that the special committee's refusal to delve into
the issue was not an unconstitutional deprivation of Claiborne's
right to a hearing on this matter by the full Senate. The court
concluded that the resolution creating the special committee
preserved the Senate's authority to go beyond the evidence provided by the committee and to order a complete investigation of
39
Claiborne's allegations of investigative wrongdoing.
The second, less apparent reason was that the special committee already had decided to base the conviction on a full,
separate investigation of the tax fraud counts of which Claiborne
previously had been convicted. 40 This early decision by the committee distanced the impeachment proceeding from the original
investigation, criminal trial, and jury verdict, and therefore made
Claiborne's attack on the handling of the first investigation
irrelevant, even if meritorious. 41

increase in the cost of litigation.
FED. R. Civ. P 11. If violated, Rule 11 then provides that:
the court
shall impose upon the person who signed the [motion], a
represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an
order to pay to the other party the amount of the reasonable expenses
incurred because of the filing of the [motion],
Id.
39 See PretrialConference, supra note 18.
0 Id.
4
This author, for one, expressed concern regarding the improper and seemingly
vindictive manner in which the original investigation and prosecution of Judge Claiborne
was conducted:
As just mentioned, however, I am disturbed by the allegations of prosecutorial targeting in the case of then Judge Claiborne. I am concerned
about the possible overzeaiousness on the part of the Justice Department,
the special strike force, and agents of the Internal Revenue Service.
Although our common law has traditionally granted prosecutors wide
discretion in how they prosecute, that discretion surely has its limits. The
prosecution of Harry Clalborne, I believe, may have been at the outer
limits of that discretion.
Consequently, I support the establishment of a special investigatory
committee which will inquire into these allegations of I.R.S. and Strike
Force improprieties.
Statement of Senator McConnell in Explanation of Impeachment, 132 CoNO. Rac. 99th
Cong., 2d Sess. S16,241 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1986).
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C. Relevance of the Criminal Conviction and the Senate's
Decision to Reject the Third Article of Impeachment
The creation of a special committee to manage the impeachment trial indicated the Senate's desire to streamline the process
and to minimize the full body's responsibility for amassing and
digesting evidence. Yet, from the moment that the House presented its four articles of impeachment to the Senate, there was
considerable resistance to adopting the most streamlined approach embodied in Article Three:
On August 10, 1984, in the U.S. District Court for the District
of Nevada, Judge Harry E. Claiborne was found guilty by a
twelve-person jury of making and subscribing a false income
tax return for the calendar year 1979 and 1980.
[w]herefore,
Judge Harry E. Claiborne was and is guilty of misbehavior
42
and was and is guilty of high cnmes.
As previously mentioned, the House Managers had immediately moved in the special committee for a summary disposition
of the impeachment conviction 43 based wholly on the jury verdict
and the criminal conviction of two years earlier. 44 Of course, the
committee did not possess the authority to rule on the motion.
Nonetheless, the Chairman went to great lengths to dissuade his
colleagues from such a facile strategy 4First, the Chair stressed that the constitutional design of the
impeachment process demonstrated the framers' intentions to
46
construct a system entirely separate from the judicial branch.
Alexander Hamilton, writing in Federalist No. 65, 47 described
the process as a "double prosecution," intended to provide
impeached officials with the "double security intended them by
a double trial." 48 Excessive reliance on the findings or the verdict
of a prior trial would deprive the official of a unique procedural
protection embedded in the Constitution.

,2 See supra note 2.
41H.R. REP. No. 688, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986).

"Id.
" See infra notes 46-56 and accompanying text.
" PretrialConference, supra note 18.
Tim FEDERALIST No. 65, at 333 (A. Hamilton) (Gary Willis, ed. 1982).
"Id.
41
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Further, there were several practical reasons for granting, in
effect, a trial de novo on the tax fraud charges against Claiborne.
Although the two-year-old criminal conviction appeared secure,
a subsequent reversal would at least embarrass the Senate and
could undermine the entire impeachment if the Senate relied too
much on the earlier proceeding.
In addition, the committee did not want to tie the hands of
future Senates by establishing a precedent for deferring to courts
of law Some Senators, including the author, expressed the concern that such a precedent could estop the Senate from impeaching an official for improprieties of which he had been acquitted
for narrow technical reasons. 49 In fact, one such case already
had appeared on the horizon: United States District Court Judge
Alcee Hastings of Florida was acquitted of bribery charges but
was the subject of judicial disciplinary proceedings and consid50
ered a likely target for impeachment.
Last, a hornet's nest of allegations of investigative and prosecutorial wrongdoing surrounded Claiborne's criminal conviction.5 1 Relying too heavily on the findings and results of that
case 52 could obligate the Senate to pass on these allegations, a
burden that the committee wanted to avoid at all costs. 53 This
path not only would require extensive testimony and delay, but
it also would force the Senate to decide the legitimacy of a prior
judicial action; nothing could be further from the Hamiltoian
ideal of a "double tnal, ' ' 54 with clear demarcations between the
judicial and Senate proceedings.
Therefore, to balance the competing interests of expediency
and senatorial independence, the committee struck a compromise: it would allow into the impeachment record much of the
testimony and evidence presented at Claiborne's criminal trial
and preserve Claiborne's right to challenge such evidence before
the full Senate on the basis of the alleged improprieties. 55

49 Wash.

Post, Oct. 10, 1986, at Al.
50Id.
Wash. Post, Sept. 17, 1986, at A5.
U.S. v. Claiborne, 781 F.2d 1327 (1986).
,3See PretrialConference, supra note 18.
, THm FEDERALiST No. 65, supra note 47.
51See PretrialConference, supra note 18.
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Second, the committee would conduct an entirely new trial
on the tax fraud charges and counsel against basing the impeachment conviction on Article Three. In the words of Chairman
Mathias, quoting in part from a report by the Senate Select
Committee on Ethics on the expulsion of former Senator Harrison Williams:
Its report stated, and I'm quoting, "The [Ethics] Committee's
unanimous recommendation of expulsion reflects its strong
conviction that its own determination of the matter and that
of the Senate must be made independently of the jury's verdict.
" Our responsibility to exercise independent judgment
is certainly no less, and indeed may even be greater, when the
question before us is the removal of an officer of another
56
branch of the Federal government.
On October 9, 1986, after receiving and considering the sixinch-thick transcript of the special impeachment committee,
ninety-seven Senators solemnly cast their votes on the four articles of impeachment against Judge Claiborne.5 7 The comproinse worked out in pretrial conference effectively carried the
day Senators voted overwhelmingly in favor of conviction on
the first, second, and fourth articles of impeachment, each of
which had been fully tried de novo by the special committee. 58
Claiborne was acquitted on the third article, which urged his
removal solely on the basis of the prior conviction, by a vote of
forty-six in favor of conviction and seventeen against. 59
The Senate also accepted the evidentiary record prepared by
the special committee, 60 much of which had been culled from
the criminal trial, 61 and heard Claiborne's personal testimony on
how his conviction was tainted by prosecutorial and investigative
wrongdoing; 62 however, the Senate refused to convene a full trial

56

Id.

See supra note 3.
59Id.
59Impeachment requires two-thirds of the Senators present to vote in favor of any
17

one article of impeachment. 132 CONG. REc. S15,503 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1986).
61 The Committee Report was not formally incorporated into the Congressional
Record. It was used, as any other committee report, as an authoritative body of

information.
61 See supra note 52.
- 132 CONG. REc. S15,503 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1986).
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on Claiborne's allegations or to order witnesses on his motion
because the impeachment "sought to determine the wrongdoing
of only Judge Harry E. Claiborne ' 63 and because the committee
and several other Senators already had decided to forego conviction on Article Three, minimizing their reliance on the criminal trial. 64
The labors and the tactical decisions of the Special Impeachment Committee played a determinative role in the Senate's
impeachment of Judge Harry E. Claiborne. The committee not
only saved countless hours of the full Senate's time, but it also
exerted tremendous influence on the Senate's ultimate decision.
The Senate Impeachment Rules 65 establishing the committee emphatically preserved the Senate's investigative powers and provided that the Senate could entirely set aside the comnuttee's
report and convene a full impeachment trial de novo. Nonetheless, the creation of a special committee by Senate resolution66
demonstrated that the Senate intended to defer largely to the
committee and to accord the committee broad latitude in managing the impeachment proceedings.
At the same time, the special committee procedure should
not be interpreted as an abdication of the Senate's profound
responsibilities with respect to the impeachment process. In voting against Article Three, or impeachment by prior conviction,
the full Senate explicitly declared its intention of retaining strict
control over judicial impeachments-an intention that must be
given consideration when examming proposed changes to the
tradition-bound, constitutionally-rich impeachment process.
PROPOSALS TO CHANGE THE SENATE'S ROLE IN JUDICiAL

II.

IMPEACIMENTS

The author emerged from the Claiborne impeachment, as
did many of his colleagues, with mixed feelings concerning the

63

See supra note 41. See Senate Impeachment Rules, supra note I1.

64 Referring to the negative vote on impeachment Article III, Sen. Alan J. Dixon

(D-Ill.) stated that many Senators did not want "to set the precedent that a conviction
or that a person who was acquitted would be
would be equivalent to impeachment
found not eligible for impeachment." Wash. Post, Oct. 10, 1986, at A18.
65 See Senate Impeachment Rules, supra note 11.
6Id.

1987-88]

SENATE'S ROLE IN IMPEACHMENT

impeachment mechanism. Although the process is every bit as
cumbersome as it is often described, this was the likely intent
of the framers of the Constitution. As Senator Mathias noted,
The Founding Fathers were deeply concerned over the conflict
between judicial independence and judicial accountability They
were well aware, as Justice Black noted in his dissent in Chandler v Judicial Council, 398 U.S. 74, 143 (1970), "that the
judges of the past-good patriotic judges-had occasionally
lost not only their offices but had also sometimes lost their
freedom and their heads because of the actions and decrees of
other judges. They were determined that no such things should
happen here." They came to the Constitutional Convention
with these lessons from history well in mind. 67
The author shares his former colleague's belief that the framers were wise to ensure the independence of the judicial branch
of our government. Further, Congress would do well to keep
that concern firmly in mind. Lord Bryce, an eminent observer
of the American political system, once observed:
Impeachment
is the heaviest piece of artillery in the congressional arsenal, but because it is so heavy it is unfit for
ordinary use. It is like a hundred-ton gun which needs complex
machinery to bring it into position, an enormous charge of
power to fire it, and a large mark to aim at.6s
Indeed, Congress has a very large mark at which to aim
when it considers judicial impeachments: an equal, coordinate
branch of government without sufficient means to defend itself
against majoritarian excesses. Thus, the author views proposals
to change the process of judicial discipline and impeachment
with some trepidation.
The last major reform in judicial discipline, the Judicial
Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of
1980,69 was enacted despite substantial constitutional concerns
of some members of Congress for the independence of the

6

S. REP. No. 362, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1979) (additional views of Sen.

Charles McC. Mathias).

I J. BRYcE, THE AmRicAN CommoNwATH 283 (1888).
28 U.S.C. § 372 (Supp. 1986).
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judicial branch. Further, many members expressed concern, which
the author shares, about the prospect of increased demands on
limited Senate resources imposed by growing numbers of impeachment trials generated by the administrative simplifications
of that Act.
Senator Heflin's proposed constitutional amendment" would
grant Congress the authority to provide alternative procedures
to impeachment for removal of federal judges. 71 This amendment
should be approached with some caution. Congress should not
lightly disregard the framers' legitimate concerns for the independence of the federal judiciary
A. The Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and
Disability Act of 1980
Frustrations with the impeachment process are hardly new
In 1980, the Senate Judiciary Committee recognized that
the impeachment process has become unduly cumbersome and
ineffective. It requires more time than either the House of
Representatives or the Senate may realistically be able to provide.
[It] has fallen into disuse because the legislature
cannot divert time from their increasing and relatively more
important legislative assignments. More importantly, the Committee recognizes that most judicial discipline will involve conduct which falls short of the conduct required for the
commencement of impeachment proceedings. Thus the Act
attempts to fill the void which currently exists between the
72
impeachable offenses and doing nothing at all.
The 96th Congress sought to provide the federal judiciary with
the means to keep its house in order and, at the same time,
provide an orderly procedure for screening complaints of impeachable offenses and then forwarding them to the House of
Representatives for consideration.

70 S.

REP No. 362, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
11S.J. Res. 113, 100th Cong., ist Sess. (1987).
S. REP. No. 362, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 4-5 (1979). This report also noted that
the average Senate impeachment trial lasted 16 days and some have taken as long as six
weeks.
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Although the rudimentary disciplinary powers granted to the
federal judiciary by the 96th Congress in the Judicial Councils
Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980 seem
both necessary and logical, they are not without constitutional
implications. 73 Further, the administrative mechanism created to
receive, to evaluate, and to refer complaints of impeachable
conduct may well present Congress with increasing numbers of
possible impeachments to consider
The adnminstrative framework created by the Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 198074

contemplates three layers of review and evaluation for complaints of judicial misconduct: (1) by the chief judge of the
circuit in which the judge sits; (2) by the judicial council of the
circuit; and (3) by the Judicial Conference of the United States. 75
At the entry level, the chief judge of the circuit screens
complaints. 76 Complaints enter the system at the circuit court of
appeals level 7 7 and the judge whose conduct is in question is
afforded initial notice of the complaint. 7 8 The chief judge may
summarily dispose of the complaint if it directly relates to the
merits of a ruling or if it is frivolous. 79 Alternately, the chief
judge may simply conclude the proceedings if the appropriate
corrective action has already been taken.8 0
If the complaint cannot be disposed of at this level, the chief
judge must then appoint a special committee, composed of the
chief judge and an equal number of circuit and district judges,
to further investigate the complaint."' The committee holds full
2
subpoena powers to effectuate its investigation.8
The judicial council of the circuit has initial responsibility
for sanctions, if deemed necessary 83 The special committee ap-

71See infra notes 96-98 and accompanying text.
7 See supra note 69.
75

Id.

76 28

U.S.C. at § 372(c)(1-2).

" Id.
"

Id. at § 372(c)(2).

Id. at
10Id. at
" Id. at
,1 Id. at
" Id. at
71

§ 372(c)(3)(A).
§ 372(c)(3)(B).
§ 372(c)(4).
§ 372(9)(A).
§ 372(c)(11)-(12).
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pointed by the chief judge 4 forwards its findings to the judicial
council of the circuit, which determines whether and which
sanctions are appropriate.8 - The judicial council wields a wide
array of disciplinary powers provided to the federal bench to
86
correct lesser judicial malfeasance.
The statute enumerates six possible disciplinary actions the
7
judicial council may take, short of actual removal of the judge.
When warranted, the judicial council may issue an order directing the chief judge of the district to take such action as the
judicial council considers appropriate, most probably an informal reprimand.88 Alternatively, the judicial council may issue an
order certifying the disability of the judge 9 and requesting that
he or she voluntarily retire, 9° prohibiting further assignment of
cases to the judge, 91 or censuring the judge by either private
commumcation or public announcement. 92 Due process rights
are accorded the judge by a combination of prior notice and a
93
full and fair opportunity to be heard.
Finally, the judicial council may forward the complaint to
the Judicial Conference of the Umted States, particularly where
conduct approaches the constitutional grounds for impeachment:
"treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors." 94
At this juncture, the Judicial Conference would then conduct
such further investigation as it deemed necessary, adopt one of
the alternatives described above, or, by majority vote, recommend to the House of Representatives that its consideration of
impeachment may be warranted. 95

Id. at § 372(c)(4).

Id. at § 372(c)(5).
Id. at § 372(c)(6)(B).

Id. at § 372(c)(6)(B)(i).
'

Id.

, Id. at § 372(c)(6)(B)(ii) (cross referencing 28 U.S.C. § 372(b)).
Id. at § 372(c)(6)(B)(iii).

- Id. at § 372(c)(6)(B)(iv).
12Id. at § 372(c)(6)(B)(v)-(vi).
13Id. at § 372(c)(1 1). The judge is given the opportunity to compel the attendance
of witnesses and the production of documents, to cross-examine witnesses, and to present
argument orally or in writing. Id. at § 372(c)(11)(A-C).

Id. at § 372(c)(7).
SId. at § 372(c)(8).
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The crux of the constitutional dilemma, which framed the
debate on the Judicial Councils Reform Act, was whether Congress could constitutionally enact a system of judicial discipline
short of impeachment. Opponents of the legislation, particularly
Senator Heflin, argued that impeachment was the sole constitutional means of judicial discipline. 96 Arguably, the Judicial
Conference's role in recommending consideration of impeachment comes close to being an unconstitutional burden on the
lifetime tenure guaranteed by the Constitution to members of

the federal judiciary

97

Both the Senate and House Judiciary Committees were careful to distinguish the disciplinary structure created by the Judicial
Councils Reform Act from the constitutional roles of the House
and the Senate in the impeachment process. They argued that
the disciplinary structure of the Judicial Councils Reform Act
was a necessary supplement to the burdensome remedy of impeachment, preserving the constitutional procedures of impeachment and Senate tnal. 9s The author believes that the provisions
of the Judicial Councils Reform Act are constitutional, as both
a logical and a necessary implication of the growth in the federal
judiciary; however, the wisdom of the Judicial Conference's role
in recommending consideration of impeachments is a different
question entirely
The administrative mechanism contained in the Judicial
Councils Reform Act may have some potentially troubling implications for the House and the Senate. To date, only eleven
federal judges have ever been impeached, a figure that might
well be higher but for the cumbersome impeachment process. 99
The administrative mechanism now in place quite conceivably
could funnel increasing numbers of impeachments into the House

9 S. REP. No. 362, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1979) (additional views of Sen.
Howell Heflin).
9, S. REP No. 362, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. 22 (1979).
" The Senate report emphasized that
the purpose and goal of these new provisions is to establish a mechanism
which deals with matters which for the most part fall short of being subject
to impeachment. And, where impeachment may be appropriate, traditional
constitutional procedures continue to govern.
S. REP. No. 362, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1979).
N. Y. Times, April 2, 1986, at A16.
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for consideration. Even assuming that the House only acts to
impeach a very small number of these, the Senate might increasingly be forced to perform its constitutional role as the forum
and the jury for the impeachment trial.
Although some argue for more impeachments, contending
that the present system may "keep venal and incompetent judges
on the bench, sullying the reputation of the Federal Judiciary,"
others believe assuring the independence of the federal judicial
branch is equally important. 100 Gerald McDowell, Justice Department prosecutor in the federal criminal prosecutions of Judge
Harry Claiborne and Judge Walter L. Nixon Jr., was quoted as
saying that, although he was outraged by the facts of these
cases, "it's a reasonable price to pay It's not a terrible abuse
when you consider that the judges who are honest have a sense
of independence."'' 0 1
The author would agree with McDowell that the more
streamlined judicial impeachments become, the less independent
the federal judiciary will be. Also, whether the prospect of
weeding out a few venal and incompetent judges is worth the
cost of losing the independence of one of our three equal branches
of government is questionable. Thus, the author approaches
proposals to streamline the impeachment process with considerable caution.
B.

Senate Joint Resolution 113

Senator Heflin's proposed constitutional amendment arose
from his concern that the impeachment mechanism is simply
unworkable. 0 2 Discussing his opposition to passage of the Judicial Councils Reform Act,103 Senator Heflin noted that he
shared "this Committee's concern that the greatly enlarged size
of the federal judiciary, as well as its expanding role in today's
society, demand the formulation of some method of judicial

100Id.
101Id.

,02S.J. Res. 113, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
103 28 U.S.C. at § 372.
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accountability'04 other than the time-consuming process of impeachment."1 05
There is no question that the Senator is correct in judging
the current impeachment process as cumbersome in the ex-

treme, 1° 6 but the author would add a note of caution against
undercutting the independence of the judiciary

The judicial

branch itself is understandably sensitive to the danger. The House
report on the Act noted that
[a]lthough the Judicial Conference as early as 1975 approved
judicial discipline legislation in principle, and reaffirmed this
position in later years, it consistently expressed its genuine
concern that enactment of any bill authorizing removal of an
Article III judge from office by any method other than impeachment would raise grave constitutional questions which

should be avoided. 1°7

Although Senator Heflin seeks to avoid these questions by
proposing a constitutional amendment to allow Congress to pro-

vide alternative procedures for removal of Article III judges, his
proposal has serious implications for the balance of powers
between the different branches of the government.108
Senate Joint Resolution 113 is a deceptively simple grant of
power to Congress.'01 The joint resolution provides in relevant
part:

1o,
Sen. Heflin was careful to define judicial accountability as pertaining to the
non-decision rather than the decision-making function of judges. As he nghtly stated,
disciplinary measures against a judge must not be undertaken out of philosophical
differences. S. REP. No. 362, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1979).
105
Id.
11 In his '-Dear Colleague" letter circulated prior to introduction of S.J. Res. 113,
Sen. Heflin argued that "the Senate is no longer structurally able to conduct a long and
complicated impeachment trial and that it is unrealistic to expect 100 Senators to act as
both judge and jury during such a trial." Letter from Howell Heflin to Senate Members
(undated) (see Appendix A, infra).
H. REP. No. 1313, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1980).
"
The author is indebted to Ms. Elizabeth B. Bazan, Legislative Attorney for the
Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress, for her perceptive analysis
of S.J. Res. 113. Bazan, An Analysis of S.J. Res. 113, A Proposed Constitutional
Amendment Relating to the Removal of FederalJudges, Sept. 14, 1987, Congressional
Research Service Report for Congress 87-764A.
10 S.J. Res. 113, 100th Cong., IstSess. (1987).
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Section 1. The Congress shall have the power to provide
procedures for the removal from office of Federal judges
serving pursuant to Article III of the Constitution, found to
have committed treason, bribery, or other high crimes and
misdemeanors.110
After ratification, Congress could then delegate, in whole or
in part, its removal power over Article III judges. The author
questions whether Congress is capable of devising sufficient procedural safeguards to ensure the continued independence of the
judicial branch.
Senate Joint Resolution 113 may raise more questions than
it solves. The crux of the problem lies in the generality of its
language."' Although Senator Heflin sought "in no way [to]
alter the reasons for which a federal judge can be removed,"" 2
by drawing "the causes" 3 for removal directly from the Constitution,"'1 4 his amendment does not specify who ultimately would
5
determine whether removal is warranted."
If exclusive control of the impeachment mechanism is vested
in the judiciary, that body may well be subjected to internal as
well as external political pressures, from which it should be
instead insulated. As Senator Paul Laxalt commented,
[t]he Federal Courts are the final link in our system of checks
and balances. They are the last to act, and the last to change.
After the legislature and executive branches have acted, after
the press has analyzed, reported and commented, and even
after the public has experienced changes and additions to our
systems and to our laws, the courts finally rule on the legality,
the constitutionality, the application, and the scope of those
changes and laws.
That review follows the debate on the need for and the
advisability of such changes with good cause. Making that

110Id.
"I Bazan, supra note 108.

See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
Found to have committed treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
112

113

114

Id.

M S.J. Res. 113, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
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in my
process more susceptible to political pressure will not,
6
own opinion, improve our system of Government."

Insulation of the judicial branch from political pressure by
the other coordinate branches is a quality of our system that
should not be lightly discarded. At the same time, if the judiciary
is granted the power to determine whether judges are "found to
have committed ' " 7 impeachable offenses, Congress may be relinquishing its best "check" on the judicial branch of the government.""
The chief concern of the author is that a "fast-track" procedure for removal of federal judges could compromise the
independence of the federal judiciary Senator Mathias cogently
set forth the dilemma during Senate impeachment proceedings
against Judge Harry Clalborne:
Beyond the fate of this man lies one of the great checks and
balances of the Constitution. Given the vastly increased workload of the Senate, there is the question of whether the institution of impeachment can survive as an efficient, effective
instrument or whether it must lumber along for five or six
weeks as in the past.
On the other hand, if the process is made too simple and
too easy it may lead to usurpation of power down the line. It
could be open to abuse if people were toppled from power for
the wrong reason.1" 9

Perhaps, as some have suggested, alternative means to the
current impeachment mechanism can be devised to meet these
concerns. Once the precisely correct balance of power between
coordinated, equal branches of government is struck, however,
the question that arises is whether the resulting complexity might
be worse than the "illness" sought to be cured.
CONCLUSION

Looking back on the impeachment trial of Judge Harry E.
Claiborne, the author is struck by the immense burden of the
116

S. REP No. 362, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 29 (1979) (additional views of Sen. Paul

Laxalt).
"1S.J. Res. 113, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. (1987).
Bazan, supra note 108.
M'N.Y. Times, Oct. 8, 1986, at A14.

"
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Senate's role in judicial impeachment proceedings imposed by
the Constitution. The author was privileged, not only to be a
member of the Senate during these proceedings, but also to be
a member of the Special Impeachment Senate Committee appointed to hear evidence and to prepare the impeachment record
for the full Senate. As the first section of this Article explains,
the Committee saved countless hours of the fufl Senate's time
and exerted tremendous influence on the Senate's ultimate decision.
Although the author can fully appreciate the universal description of the impeachment process as extremely cumbersome,
he would dispute the contention that Congress' responsibility is
an unwarranted burden. The respective roles of the House and
the Senate in judicial impeachments were carefully planned by
the framers of the Constitution. Even though the Congress of
today is faced with a legislative burden far beyond what the
framers could have envisioned, that in no way diminishes the
core value of coordinated, equal branches of government and
the importance of Congress' role in preserving the balance of
power.
The institutional weakness of the judiciary, the branch of
government most vulnerable to the storms of political pressure,
should not be readily exposed to such influence. The author
does not profess to have a solution to the dilemma at hand, but
rather he urges caution and meditations upon the Constitution
in analyzing proposals to change the procedures of judicial impeachment.
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Appendix A
United 5tatezs nate
COMMITTEEON THEJUDICIARY
WASHINGTON.DC 20510
JOSEPH
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DELAWARE
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R. SIIOS O
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CHARMS
. GRASSLEY.
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ARLEN
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HUMPHRE.
NEW
HAMPIRE

HOWE".
BlOW AUIARkCIUMIA
UOWARO
BE.
MIHTRBAUM.
ORO CHARLES
. GRASSLEY.
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SOUTH
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-,AIE
OIWH

SIMONIROWRRTTL
0WU

Dear" Colleague:
Within the next couple of weeks, I will introduce a
constitutional amendment to give Congress the power to provide
for alternative procedures for removing federal judges from
office.
At the end of the 99th Congress, after participating in
the Claiborne impeachment proceedings, I determined that the
current method of impeaching federal judges was unworkable. I
feel that the Senate is no longer structurely able to conduct a
long and complicated impeachment trial and that it is
unrealistic to expect 100 Senators to act as both judge and
jury during such a trial.
The amendment which I will propose. will in no way alter
the reasons for which a federal judge can be removed.
Further,
the causes for removal stated in the amendment have been drawn
directly from the Constitution.
As our federal judiciary
grows, it is very possible that we will be faced with more than
one impeachment trial every 50 years. We must devise a method
of removing federal judges which is both fair to the individual
and maintains one of the essential requirements of justice--an
independent judiciary.
If you are interested in cosponsoring the enclosed
constitutional amendment. please contact Tom Young of my
Judiciary staff at 4-4022.
Sincerely,

Howell Heflin
HH/ty
Ene

4.3
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